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The Fall of the Industrial City:
The Reagan Legacy for Urban Policy
DAVID STOESZ
policyAmerica and San Diego State University
School of Social Work

The Reagan presidency reversed a half-century of federal aid to cities.
Poor minority comnnunities were particularly hard-hit, since this was
accompanied by a white flight to the suburbs and the replacement of better paying industrial jobs requiring little education with poorer paying
service jobs requiring iore education. Meanwhile wealthy communities
prospered. To address urgent social problems, urban politicians are advocating strategies such as industrialpolicy, public entrepreneurship,and
guerrilla wlfare.
The Reagan presidency oversaw a fundamental change in
American urban policy-the demise of the drab, industrial city
and the rise of its glittering, postindustrial successor. Reversing
a policy stance established during the New Deal, the Reagan
administration failed to develop federal legislation to ameliorate the social and economic dislocation concomitant with the
very substantial shifts in capital and population which have
occurred. In place of a visible and coherent urban policy, the
Reagan administration preferred an oblique, but highly successful, strategy in urban affairs. This strategy decimated categorical
grants to cities for the purposes of economic and community development, exacerbating an already-marginal standard of living
for the poor who were experiencing significant loss of benefits
through means-tested programs. Less recognized at the time,
tax cuts and deregulation served to accelerate the flight of capital from the industrial, "rustbowl" in favor of the postindustrial,
"sunbelt." A decade after the inauguration of Ronald Reagan,
the two issues most prominent in urban America follow from
this strategy: the emergence of an underclass in older cities, and
the massive Savings and Loan scandal attributable to speculation in the booming metropolitan areas of the West and South.
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Urban Policy and Social Welfare
Since its inception during the Progressive Era, urban policy
has been inextricably bound to the American welfare state. The
predecessors of modern social service agencies were established
in America's industrial heartland before the turn of the century:
the first Charity Organization Society in Buffalo in 1877; the first
Settlement House in New York City in 1887 (soon followed by
the most well-known Settlement-Hull House-in Chicago in
1889) (Axinn and Levin, 1982). The Progressive penchant for
efficient admninistration directly influenced the next generation
of social service agencies, as evident in the Milford Conference
Report, which detailed the structure and process of both public
and private agencies (National Associatioi) of Social Workers,
1974). This implicitly urban format for service provision was
replicated in virtually every city, leading Wilensky and Lebeaux
to conclude that "virtually all welfare service" was dispensed
through this model (1965, p. 231).
Progressives' concern for effective administration conplemented their campaign for good government, an attempt to rid
municipal governance from the corruption associated with the
likes of Tammany Hall's Boss Tweed and George Washington
Plunkett. "Good Government" becane a rallying cry for such
luminaries as Jacob Riis, Lincoln Steffens, and Upton Sinclair,
Together, the "clean administration" Progressives and the "good
government" Progressives laid the groundwork for what was to
become the New Deal. It is significant that many of the architects
of the American welfare state were tenants of Jane Addams'
IHTull House, among them Edith and Grace Abbott, Julia Lathrop, Florence Kelley, Frances Perkins, and John Dewey. Harry
Hopkins, a lightning-rod for many of FDR's initiatives, had
resided at New York'sk'Christadora House Settlement (Karger
and Stoesz, 1990, p. 339).
Federal urban policy began with passage of the Housing
Act of 1937, which provided assistance to states and cities for
purposes of eliminating unsafe and unsanitary housing. After
the War, the Act was amended so as to focus on slum clearance
and urban renewal (Karger and Stoesz, 1990, p, 243). The broad
authority granted to local government coupled with the lack
of advocacy by minorities and the poor resulted in federally-
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funded projects which severely damaged working class communities (Gans, 1962), often replacing them with housing projects
which resembled vertical concentration camps. In 1954, the Act
was again amended, eliminating a requirement that residential
housing be a substantial portion of federally-supported projects.
As a result, African-Americans claimed, by an ironic semantic
shift, that the "urban renewal" provision of the Act actually
meant "Negro removal."
The War on Poverty, declared by President Johnson, ushered
in a series of domestic programs which were intended to improve the plight of minorities and the poor. Because these populations disproportionately inhabited urban areas, programs
targeted for them were beneficial for cities. Among them, the
Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962 financed education and job training for the poor; the Civil Rights Act of 1964
enhanced the life opportunities for racial minorities; the Food
Stamp Act of 1964 improved nutrition of the poor; the Community Mental Health Centers Acts of 1.963 and 1965 funded
psycho-social services for the poor; the Medicaid and Medicare amendments to the Social Security Act provided health
insurance for the poor and elderly; and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1965 provided an umbrella for several important initiatives, including 1-lead Start, the Job Corps, the Legal Services Corporation, Model Cities, and the Community
Action Program.
The Community Action Program (CAP) quickly became the
most controversial facet of the War on Poverty. Because local
CAPs administered programs independent of municipal governance, they were viewed skeptically by city officials, However,
when CAPs were required to have one-third representation by
the poor in decision-making, and the poor challenged the power
structure in many cities, mayors reacted strongly (Moynihan,
1969). The instability generated by "citizen participation" in
poverty programs was punctuated by urban riots of the mid1960s which were attributed to prevalent racism and an absence
of opportunity for the poor (National Advisory Commission on
Civil Disorders, 1968). Turbulence in federal urban policy was
addressed in the Housing and Community Development Act
of 1974, which reassigned virtually all of the CAP programs
to other agencies, dismantled CAPs as they were known, and
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relegated participation of the poor to an advisory function. Reinforcing the role of meI-Opolitan government, the 1974 Act incorporated a range of programs-including urban redevelopment
and beautification, Model Cities, neighborhood iinprovement,
and historic preservation-which were budgeted at $11 billion
for 1978-80. By 1981, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development (HUD), the primary agency through which urban
policy was implemented, subsidized about 3.5 million housing
units (Karger and Stoesz, 199(0, pp. 244, 245).
The Reagan Era
With the inauguration of Ronald Reagan, a half-century of
progress in federal urban policy abruptly came to an end. The
federal reversal of aid to cities was the result of a dual strategydivesting the federal government of its responsibility for social
problems while assigning that task to subordinate levels of government (federalism), and delegating as much of the program
function as possible to nongovernmental providers (privatization). By the end of the decade, federalism and privatization
had had a profound impact on the welfare of America's cities
and their peoples.
For the record, it is important to recognize that the Reagan
legacy in urban policy was not completely remiss. During the
early 1980s, much legislative attention was directed at an initiative which promised to lure industry into the nation's, most economically depressed communities. Pioneered in Great Britain
and imported to the U.S. by Stuart Butler, a British analyst
recruited by the conservative Heritage Foundation, the Urban
Enterprize Zone (UEZ) concept was poised as the Republican
antithesis to a series of Democratic urban programs. In designating UEZs, government would offer business special considerations, such as tax rebates, reductions in the minimum wage, and
waving certain occupational and health protections, in order to
induce firms to relocate in poor areas. Aggressively promoted
by then-Representative Jack Kemp, UEZ legislation attracted
the endorsement of such disparate groups as conservative
ideologues, Democratic mayors, and civil rights organizations
(Stoesz, 1985). Yet, a combination of neglect on the part of the
Reagan administration and what was later to prove glaring
incompetence in the administration of the HUD, under the
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direction of Samuel Pierce, who was later charged with misappropriating S2 billion in low-income housing aid (Ostrow,
1990), effectively killed any prospect that UEZs would become
national policy. Ironically, the UEZ concept remains the most
viable urban policy option for the Bush administration, and it
is HUD Secretary Jack Kemp who is again promoting the idea
in the face of even greater obstacles.
Federalism and privatization provided a powerful rationale
for the withdrawal of the national government in urban policy. From 1980 to 1988, federal spending for housing decreased
from $27.9 billion to $9.7 billion (Leonard, Dolbeare, and Lazere,
1989, p. 32). As a result, the supply of low-income housing failed
to keep pace with the number of poor households. While the
number of poor renter households increased by 3.2 million between 1974 and 1985, the number of low rent units fell by 2.8
million (Greenstein and Leonard, 1990, p. 21). This, of course,
contributed significantly to increases in homelessness during
the same period.
Federal grants to cities declined sharply during the Reagan
administration. Between 1975 and 1980, federal aid to subordinate levels of government for community development block
grants increased from $38 million to $3.9 billion-but had declined to $3.3 billion by 1987. Similarly, the federal contribution
for community services block grants decreased from $557 million in 1980 to $354 million in 1986 (Statistical Abstract of the
United States, 1988, pp. 260, 337). The House Ways and Means
Committee reported that "for HUD's programs alone, appropriations of budget authority declined (in 1989 dollars) from a high
of $57 billion in 1978 to a low of $9 billion in 1989 (Committee on Ways and Means, 1990: 1311). Still, in some respects Lhe
Reagan administration pales in its dunning of urban programs
compared to that of his successor. The Bush administration budget for 1991 proposes to further reduce federal assistance for
low-income housing by 4.2%. For the same year, federal allocations for community development block grants are dropped to
$2.7 billion, and federal support for community services block
grants plummet to only $42 million (Greenstein and Leonard,
1990, Table 1).
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An Urban Diaspora
During the Reagan presidency, federal urban policy failed
utterly to address problems associated with substantial shifts
in demography and capital affecting American cities. During
the last two decades millions of Americans abandoned older,
industrial cities for the "sunbelt." John Kasarda reports that between 1975 and 1985, "the South and West accounted for more
than 85% of the nation's population growth" (1988 p. 154). The
consequence for select cities is depicted in Table 1 below.
Table I
Population Changes of Seleled Major Cities (in thousands)
City
St. Louis
Detroit
Cleveland
Buffalo
Pittsburgh
Los Angeles
Dallas
San Antonio
San Diego
Houston
Phoenix

Population
1970

Population
1984

Percentage
Change

622.2
1,511.3
751.0
462.8
520.2
2,816.1
844.2
654.3
696.6
1,232.4
581.6

429.3
1,089.0
546.5
339.0
402.6
3,096,7
974,2
842.8
960.5
1,705.7
853.3

-31.0
-27.9
-27.2
-26.8
- 22.6
+ 10.0
+ 15.4
+ 28.8
+ 37.9
+ 38.4
+ 46.7

Source: Dearborn (1988, p. 256).

Most of the explosive growth of southern and western cities
was fed by flight from those of the Northeast and Midwest.
Residents left behind in older cities tended to be minorities.
Between 1975 and 1985, the minority population of northeastern
cities increased from 33% to 42% (Kasarda, 1988, p. 156).
As the white population fled industrial urban areas, the
economic base of America's cities changed dramatically-bluecollar jobs requiring less education vanished and were replaced
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by those of the information and services sectors. This penalized particularly the unskilled and poorly-educated minority
.population left behind in industrial cities of the northeast and
.midwest. "Unfortunately, the northern cities that have lost the
greatest numbers of jobs with lower educational requisites during the past three decades," concluded Kasarda, "have simultaneously experienced large increases in the number of their
minority residents, many of whom are workers whose limited
educations preclude their employment in the new urban growth
industries" (1988, p. 178). The interaction of white flight and
technological transformation has been devastating for minorities residing in older, industrial cities, particularly African
American males, as shown in the table below.
Table 2
Unemployment Rates and Proportion of Male Central City Residents Aged
16-24 Who Are Not in School and Not in the Labor Force, by Race and
Region, 1985
Region
and Race

All regions
White

Unemployment
Rate %

13.5

Percentage Not in School
and Not in Labor Force

6.1
14.1

Black
Northeast
White

37.1
16.7

9.4

Black
West

43.5

24.5

White
Black

11.3
29.6

5.5
9.3

Source: Kasarda (1988, p. 187).

If the unemployment rate is combined with the labor force nonparticipation rate, the plight of young blacks is immediately
apparent. For example, in 1985 68.0% of young blacks living in
the northeast were unemployed or not in school or not working,
compared to 38.9% who lived in the West.
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Tie Underclass
The consequence of these developnunts has been [lie spread
of an urban "underclass." From exploralory investigalions of
the deterioration of poor, urban neiglhborliuods (Glasgow, 1981;
Auletta, 1982;! 1 cinann, 1986), social restiarchers have developed
a more sophisticaled understanding of the correlates with underclass status (Wilson, 1987; McL.analion, Garfinkel, and Watson, 1988). In a synthesis of previous sludies, McLanaihan and
her associates identified three factors contributing Lo underclass
status: persistent and weak attachment to (lie labor force, intergenerational dependence, and ghettoii.ation. Of particular interest is the latter, tie increased social isolation of the very poor,
as shown in the following table.
Table 3
"ltendsin Social Condilhms in LOqe G'niral tCilics. 1970-1980

Census Tracts with
20 Percent Poor

Percentage

Percentage
1980

Indicator

1970

Employment rate
males, 16+
AFDC families
Black persons
Poor Blacks

N.
63.3 " 56.0
19.8
28.0
27.2 26.5
30.5
28.3

Census Tracts witlh
40 Percent P'oor

Ciangev

170

1980

Change

- 13
.10
--.3
18

56.5
30.2
6.3
9.4

46.0
42.0
8.3
13.1

-22
--,1
+ 32
+4,0

Adapted from ilariahart, Garfinkel, and Wisim, (1988, p. 130)

While poverty continued to impact poor neighborhoods (census tracts with 20 percent poor), it worsened considerably the
conditions of poorer neighborhoods (census tracts witlh 10 percent poor).
A conspiracy of events, then, transformed [le industrial city
beginning in the 1970s. White flight decimated cities of the
Northeast and Midwest, leaving behind larger concentrations
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of mnorities. Technological and econoitiic shifts reduced the
demand for unskilled labor, reducing sharply employment opportunities for African-Anericans. Concomnmiltantly federal r'eductions in grants to the poor and to cities failed to help those
left behind make tip fur lost ground. As a result, the social and
economic circumstanct oif (he poor worsened considerably, lirther isolating them from the American mainstream. Unarguablv,
a consequence of the Reagan administralion's unwillingness to
fashion a coherent urban policy is the emergence of an Amercan underclass. By he ItI,s, areas of maaily industrial cities had
virtually imploded (Jewcks, 1988; Williams, 1988).
The Overclass
While industrial l'rkimi areas withered, pustindustrial cities
expanded dramatically ls a result of mlssivet infusions of capital. Rejuvenating the econony had been a primary concern for
the Reagan administralion, .of course, especially after a blistering campaign assault onl the "stagflation" that plagued the
Carter presidency. More immediately, the severe depression of
the early 1980s made it imperative that the, administration m1ove
swiftly. In short order, Congress agreed to a sizable tax cut
which benefitted wealthy individuals and corporations, and it
stripped much of tht regulatory red-tape from the financiJal industry. 'he latter action would ultimately lead to the greatest
financial debacle hi the nalion's history-- the Savings and L.oa
(S&L,) scandal.
Deregulation of the financial industry had direct iniplications for social welfare, since poverty programs were funded
through public funds. According to "stlpply-side economic theory", government exlV
)IditUNs
must be reduced since federal
1
revenues are derived from taxes, monies that the private sector needs for capitalization. In effect, "Reaganomics" held that
government cornpted with industry for capita by levying tLvs
on private revenue, starving the goose that lays the golden egg.
As regards welfare, eventually an unfettered economy would
generate an even grelter surplus which could be taxed, thereby
compensating for earlier reductions in expenditures for dlit 'stic programs. However flawless it may have seemed in theory,
in practice "Reaganomics" proved abrasive to tie nation's social
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fabric. Reagan domestic policy led to a massive shift in wealth
from the poor to the wealthy, creating an income gap that
reached its widest point since data had been first collected in
1947 (Greenstein and Barancik, 1990). And, through the deregulation of the S&L industry, it 'esulted in an enormous development program-one which ultimately favors the burgeoning
cities of the "sunbelt" at the expense of those of the "rustbowl."
By deregulating the financial industry, the Reagan adrninistration was able to replace a diminished, yet enduring, government urban policy with a corporate policy which overwhelmed
federal programs of the previous half-century. The arnount of
this "corporate urban policy" is roughly the amount taxpayers
will have to fork-over to repay depositors for money lost to
speculative investments, primarily in real estate-between $300
and $500 billion over the next ten years (Greider, 1990, p. 11).
Because S&Ls in conservatorship tend to be located in the sunbelt, the S&L bailout represents an unprecedented, intranational
transfer of funds. According to Hill, 37 states will finance the
liquidation of debt incurred in the remaining 13. Of these, several stand to gain substantially: "Texas will receive 43.2% of the
gross bailout funds, followed by Arkansas (7%), Florida (6.8%),
California (6.7%), New Mexico (5.1%), Louisiana (4.6%), Arizona
(4.2%)" (1990, p. 42). As presently conceived and assuming a final cost of $300 billion, the bailout will penalize the "frostbelt"
states $123 billion.1 In presenting his analysis, Hill identified
the bailout as an "economic development program in the same
sense that debt forgiveness" is offered to third-world nations,
except in reverse. "The bulk of the transfer will be coming from
the Northeast and Midwest, regions attempting to renew their
economies. The recipients are mainly located in regions that
have experienced rapid job growth," noted Hill. "Money capital is being taken from regions that are attempting to renew their
infrastructure, or physical capital, and given to regions with the
newest physical capital" (1990, p. 44).
While the S&L scaridal has substantial implications for urban policy, it also affec'tls the national culture. If one aspect of
the Reagan legacy in urban policy is the ridse of the "underclass" due to cutting benefits to the poor, its corollary is the
rise of the "overclass" as a result of tax cuts for the wealth, and
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fiscal wheeling and dealing. Here, Sidney Blumenthal's acerbic
portrayal is worth reprinting.
The overclass is the distorted mirror image of a caricature of
the underclass. It is not the old establishment of Prescott Bush,
George's father; it is, rather, the demimonde of rentiers who, under Reagan, elbowed their way to the top, where they hastily built
mahogany-paneled offices to create an aura of settled legitimacy.
This overclass piled up vast wealth shuffling junk bonds, paper
assets, and real estate. Its monuments are not factories but Atlantic City casinos and boarded-up department stores. The overclass battened under Reagan; under Bush it sought to consolidate
its respectability (1990, p. 20).
In an exhaustive analysis of the excesses of the Reagan era,
Kevin Phillips (1990) profiled the American "plutocracy" which
emerged during the 1980s. "Corporate executives and investors
were the prime 1980s beneficiaries," he concluded (p. 166).
Yet, the contradictions posed by an ostentatious overclass
are not so facilely reconciled with a stricken underclass. ConIsider that the $1 billion in indiscretions of Silverado S&L-in
which the President's son, Neil, is irnplicated-easily exceeds
the $691 million proposed by his father in aid for the home.less for 1991. Or, that the amount taxpayers will absolve Lin,coln S&L's Charles H. Keating, Jr. of $2.5 billion, eclipses what
the Bush administration proposed for the Women, Infants, and
Children Supplemental Food Program for 1991.2
Reconstructing Urban America
As a result of the feceral retreat from urban policy, mo'mentum gained on several fronts to address the increasingly
dire straights of many American cities. Since the programmatic
articulation of these orientations has yet to be broadly demonstrated, they are largely expressions of ideology. Still, a post'Reagan urban policy is likely to be influenced by present discussions around "industrial policy," "public entrepreneurship," or
*"guerrilla welfare." While these differ in important ways, they
'share an important dimension-an acceptance of the premise
*that the federal government is not the sole actor in resolving
urban problems.
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Industrial Policy

Citing lhe decline o" Ain,ric-iin industrv in an increasingly
competitive global economy, sevral analv,,, have called for the
creation of a national industrial policy. ILeaving tie particulars
aside, such a policy would be negotiated through a troika consisting of go',rnment,&induslrv, and labor. Since an industrial
policy would attemupt t6 bolstr e\isting indlwury threatened by
rnergkence of new
international competitors as Myell as foster theiu,
Tlrough
uril'aniipclicy.
for
inlplitaLtions
enterprises, it has direct
a national urban policy, dera ying urban inlrlki ructure could
be rebuilt, blue-collar workers retrained for riew higih-tech jobs,
cornmunities where heavy industry had prt'donlilated could be
transformed to showcases for light manufacluring and information technology. As exemplars, proponents of national industrial
policy point to Japan and West Germany wiiich have benefited
mightily from a high degree of economic nhtnagenlent during
the post-war era.
To some extent the prospets that urban America will benefit from an industrial policy are contingenl til which form of
economic management is prolosed. Drawing from leftist theoreticians (O'Connor, 1973; Cough, 1979), some analysts called
for an industrial policy heavily influenced by a national government (Thurow, 1980; Kultner, 1984, 1987). Others, showing allegiance toward labor and community, advanced more populist
initiatives (Bowles, Gordon, and Veisskopf, 1983; Alperovitz
and Faux, 1984; Harrison and Bluestone, 1988). To the righlt,
Kevin Phillips proposed a variant in which the corporate sector
was dominant (1984). Playing a middle ground, Robert Reich
opted for greater coordination amiong principles, a de facto industrial policy without calling it as mcICh (I 3, 1987).
Yet, for all the intellect aimed at developing a national economic recovery policy, a decade of deliberation failed to deliver such a policy. In fact, cit (he national level, government
pursued a laissez-faire tack, seeking further integration of the
U.S. economy in international capitalism. At the state level, tie
sole effort to develop industrial policy was reiected by Rhode
Island voters in the mid-1980s (Reich, 1989, pp. 255-57). Short of
a major economic dislocation -attributable ito a global depression, the consolidation of lheIFuropean Ectinomic Community

F1all of nlrtslrial Sic irlr
in 1992, or, quite pusilhly, the S&L crisis-the prospects of the
U.S. forging an indt .ial policy remain slim. In its absence, the
industrial cities of [Ie Northeast and Midwest will contlinue to
lose capital and plpulation.
Public Entreprencurslip
Facing the political equivalent to Chapter 11, mayors sought
alternate supports as the federal government reneged on its
comminlment to the nation's cities. Stales would pick up somle of
the slack, though some, such as California and Massachusetts,
had passed initiatives which limited state tax increases. Ultimately, city leaders had little choice but to turn to the private
sector, experimenting, with "public-private partnershis". Labeled "public en trep.renen rship" by John Kirlin, urbilellhaders
sought "to mainlain local business and employment growthand thus local government revenues-by stimulating private
sector involvement in local economic developpment projects and
urban service delivery" (Kirhin and Marshall, 1988, p. 3,19).
This strategy led mayors to inioative relationships with
foundations and business. For example, after experimenting
with locating computer assembly facililies in poor neighborhoods, Control Data Corporation established the Citv Venture
Corporation to further its plans in civic responsibilily (McKinnon et al., 1982). In order to wtean community development
progrnams from dependency on donors, the Ford Foundation
established the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (iSC) to
make them economically self-sufficitnt. By the mid-19811s, IISC
claimed assets of over $100 million and projects in 23 cities (Osborne, 1988, pp. 30.1-5). The Enterprise Foundation, founded by
developer James RoLse in 1981, tused revenues from a ])irofitmaking subsidiary to fund housing developments for the poor.
By 1984, the Enterprise Foundation claimed projects in 12 cities
and had targeted 51 cities for intervention by the uld of the
decade (Enterprise Foundation, '1983).
Such endeavors led to the creation of Community )cvelopment Corporations in several cities in order to better focus
the interests of government, fotundations, and business on distressed neighborhoods. In a review of such efforts, Osborne
urged the creation of "development banks" to regenerate poor
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communities. Citing examples such as Chicgo's Shorebank
Corporation and the Kenliick' Highlands Iniivestment Gwrlporation, Osborne concluded Ilhal
tht' idal community tlevetpieitst rah'
t y wi itld
build conijrt'hensive dec veloplenl tr 014Ili,,alions" each lailcred to IChe realities
of lhe local communit . llie,;w inslitution,; would have significant resotiurces. They would focts on hoth c'r)noinic and social
problems. Their goals would he investinrei, rather than spending. 'I
lhey would leverag as much private invstimenl as possible.
They wvould seek to build the capacity ol local people and institutioins. They would have built-in market feed back mechanisms.
And they would have hi capital and political commilmenl to
remain in place for the lonig haul (1488, p..0 21 .
What remains to be seen Of the public t'ntrepreneurial sirategy is whether it is possible to generate the capital and will
to address luhe tenacious problens associated with deteriorating
urban neigliborhoods.in habiled by the underclass. With present
government expenditures already restricted by the deficit and
future apl ropriations committed to the S&L bailout, public
funds are not likely to be fortHhcoming. Private sources, either
from foundations or corporations, are conlingent on a healthy
economy. The market crash of October I187 and wild stock
fluctuations accompanying events in the Mideast in 1990 tend
to dampen the enthusiasm of business leaders for civic projects.
Under the best of circumstances, privale sector innovations are
unlikely to produce the capital necessary to freshen the nation's
economic backwaters. SIill, considering the federal retreat from
urban affairs and the fiscal straightjacket stifling city management, mayors have little choice but make the most of "public
entreprenCLI rship".
Guerrilla IVelf'ie
Inevitably, the social and economic pathology besetting
many cities drove some community activists to radical tactics.
Radicalism has been a continuous feature of the American urban experience, so this is hardly surprising. Much of the social
programming of the American welfare state can be attributed
to radical organizers of lhe labor moveneni, reflected in the
New Deal, and the civil rights movement, reflected in the War
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on Poverty. In their classic historyN of public assistante benefits,
Piven and Clowalrd (1971) dernonsl rRled that the "generosity"
of welfare programs is actually cyclical, contingent on political and economic iistability, which is, to a degree, generated

by radical organiirs. Saul Alinsky's organizing stralegies (and
antics) in Chicag,,o, and Buffalo hav become as legendary as his
writings (1972),
Still, the 1980s narked a particularly mean period iii the nation's treatment of the economicall' and socially dispossessed.
Despite worsenin, conditions, civil disturbances of lhe 1980s
failed to materialize on a scale of those of the 1960s. To address problems of the homeless in Washington, D.C., Mitch
Snyder and olher pacifist radicals, founded the C1ommnitV
for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV). While the Reagan administration launched its assault on lpoverty programs in the early
1980s, CCNV began its offensive against Reagan. " hrough such
dramatic actions as creating a symbolic cemetery--in .afayette
Park across from the White House-of those having died of exposure, and undertaking several hunger strikes, CCNV seized the
moral high ground. Ultimately, CCNVs radical tactics not only
led to concessions by the Reagan administration in aid to the
homeless in the nalion's capital, but contributed to the passage
of the McKinney I lomeless Assislamce Act in 1987 (I lomnbs and
Snyder, 1983; Simon, 1990; fill, 199(1). In Milwaukee, a classic
example of the disinvestment alfteting older, indtisIrial cities,
alderman Mike Mt e formed the Black Panther Nlilitia, threatening the city %vith violence unless $100 million was invested
in the African-Anierican comm unity there. Milwatike&'s director of the department of 9ocial services, I loward Fuller, pointed
to the city's loss of 25,000 manufacturing jobs during the last
15 years as the source of growing militancy by Blacks. McGee
has hinted at a terrorist strike at convention facilities or rolling
burning tires onto frTeways, tactics that do not scm so farfetched once the uniformed and cadenced Militia is considered.
"I've been studyinig this. I've got 1,001 ways that we can completely disrupt while life in Milwaukee," observed McCee, "It
ain't going to take a lot" (Maraniss, 1990, pp. 9-10).
The 1990s are apt to see an upsurge in radicalism in American cities. As the federal government walked away from cities

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
and business migrated to tie sunbelt (andltoverseas), mayors
scrambled to cobble togetlhwr resources W1dh,,l with a host of
festering problems. Increasingly, urban factions had to compete
for diminishing resources. In particular, corn tpelit ion increased
among those trying to clean tup the social debris left behind,
a problem exacerbated since their consLituents Vere economically and politically peripheral. Radical tactics were a quick
and visible methodtof climbing to the t op of lie public agenda.
The problem with guerrilla welfare, as Max Weber would have
noted, is routinizing civil disobedience. With Snydt'r's suicide,
it is difficult to identify a figure capable (f Iransforming local achievements into a populist movement m behalf of the
disenfranchised.) Insurgent tactics will protbably become more
plausible among frutsrated urban activists, but radicalism in the
U.S. has not always been progressive. Social and economic conditions which marginalize the poor, fostering the likes of CCNV
and McGee, also inarginalize the working class, breeding the intolerance of evangelical reactionaries and wi hile sulpremacists.
Denouement
Approaching the end of the century, it is difficult to be sanguine about the emergence of an urban policy that is beneficent toward minorilies and [lie poor. Evoking federalism and
privatization, the Reagan administration was able to reverse a
half-century of federal support for the nation's cities; yet, a conservative, governmettal program of urban development failed
to emerge. Instead, deregulation of financial institutions resulted
in a massive, corporate urban aid program-.more popularly
known as the S&L c.its-which benefits cities of the "sunbelt"
at the expense of those in the "rustbowl". lb worsen matters,
Reagan rhetoric was followed by Bush's ingenuous appeal to
American altruism as a substitute for effective action. In a real
sense, the Reagan legacy for urban policy has been "a thousand
points of blight."
For their part, advocates for the urban poor have begun the
task of fashioning a post-Reagan urban policy, but they have
much work to do. 1he prospects of a comprehensive strategy
through industrial policy are faint; private-public partnerships
have been noteworthy, but spotty; and, radical action is even
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more idiosyncraLiC, Still, it has been out of such cunfusion and
despair that major initiatives have been advanced in the nation's
welfare experience. Social activists can look to leaders of the
Progressive and Civil Rights movements for models of those
who have championed efforts to deal with urban povurty while
advancing social justice. However discouraging the recent past,
the future is redolent with opportunity.
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Notes
1, For this calculation, a ratio used by Hill was employed. Hill's penalty for
the frostbelt states was placed at $51.6 billion, but this was based on an
earlier, low assessment of bailout costs.
2. Details on Neil Bush's activities can be found in Day (1990), those on
Keating, in Adams (1990), Budget figures are from Greenstein and Leonard

(1990).
3. For details on Alinsky, see Horwitt (1989); on grassroots organizing, see
Paget (1990).
4. The most-likely candidate is Jesse Jackson; however, his political philosophy has become more mainstream as a result of his involvement in presidential politics and those of (he District of Columbia.

